In 1979, the largest recorded outbreak of anthrax occurred in Rhodesia, present He is a former CIA Intelligence Officer who has written several articles dealing with international law. I wish to thank the Editorial staff of the Review, which worked tirelessly to bring this article forward. I dedicate this article to the thousands of Zimbabweans, both black and white, who suffered needlessly during the war and continue to suffer.
Harare-formerly Salisbury-under the auspices of Cecil Rhodes British South African Company (BSAC). 2 The area was thought to be rife with gold deposits and was said to be the ancient site of King Solomon's mines.' Through a treaty with the King of the Matabeles, the BSAC was responsible for administration of the territory. 4 In 1893, the Ndebele-another ethnic group-took up arms against the colonizers, but were swiftly defeated in the Matabele War. In 1896, the Ndebele, joined by the Shona, rose again in rebellion against the pioneers.' The Chimurenga War'-as the indigenous groups called the war-was brutally suppressed by the Rhodesians by 1897.8 to 5989 in favor of self-rule. Id. 15. See NESBIT & COWDEROY, supra note 7, at 6. "The limited powers reserved to the British government in 1923 had never been invoked. It seemed that these powers had been ceded by default and could thus be forgotten, so that a defacto Dominion status was in being." Id.
16. See MARSHALL, supra note 9, at 97. 3) federate with Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia) and Nyasaland (present day Malawi) creating a new British dominion. 20 Furthermore, there was an idealism in Britain that Southern Rhodesia could help to develop both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and that whites and blacks could live and work together in a partnership. 2 1 In 1953, amidst much enthusiasm, the Central African Federation was born. 22 "The most crucial area of administration, that of the African affairs, was left in territorial hands because Britain would not relinquish her role as protector. This meant that Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans were ultimately ruled by London and Southern Rhodesian Africans by Salisbury." 3 The black population revolted and began guerilla activities aimed at eventual independence in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. 24 The revolt signaled the death knell of the Federation. 25 
C. Southern Rhodesia and Independence -The Growth of African Nationalism
In 1962, Nyasaland (the least developed territory of the Federation) was allowed to secede, even though constitutionally this was forbidden. 26 "Northern Rhodesia's secession terminated the Federation's short life on 31 December 1963. " ,27 Nonetheless, the tide of black majority rule was stopped by Southern Rhodesia. Whites from the Congo, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia streamed into Southern Rhodesia as refugees, and strengthened the resolve of the white minority. 2 The new line dividing controlled areas from independent black Africa was drawn from Portuguese Angola, across Rhodesia, and on to Portuguese controlled Mozambique. The southern flank was anchored by apartheid South Africa.
With the dissolution of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia wanted independence. 29 According to Ian Smith, the British government had promised CULTURE: 1902-1936 (2001 As early as 1956, the security forces, including the police, recognized that the major problem confronting them would be African unrest. 36 "Thus the security forces trained and prepared for counter-insurgency at home, as well as reinforcing British efforts in Malaya and studying the counter-insurgency effort against the Mau Mau in Kenya. 37 In 1950, Rhodesia created its own Special Air Service (SAS) and sent the team to Malaya to help the British fight a Communist insurgency there. 38 The SAS became the backbone of Rhodesia's special operations team. "The Army devoted half its training to counter-insurgency, while the Air Force formed a counter-insurgency squadron. Because insurgency essentially challenges the law, the police took 30 
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the lead with the military in support. Thus the counter-insurgency campaign began on a low key, led by the (BSAP)." 39 In early September 1962, the Zimbabwe Liberation Army proclaimed the Zimbabwe Revolution resulting in an outbreak of sabotage and arson." The government "banned ZAPU and declared that it would not be allowed to reappear in another guise.... There followed detentions, police raids and the first uncovering of stocks of explosives and weapons, including sub-machine guns and hand-guns. 1,094 persons were arrested." '4 1 "[I]n 1963, a resurgence of urban violence had been quelled by mandatory death sentences for petrol bombing." 42 The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU) dispatched young men for guerrilla training in China. 43 The first of the terror killings was in July 1964."
With the indigenous Africans increasingly in rebellion, Ian Smith, the most prominent hard-liner, rose to power within the Rhodesian Front (RF). 45 In December 1962, the RF, led by Smith, won the general elections. Their first priority in 1963 was to secure independence. 46 In September 1964 Douglas-Home said he would accept the 1961 Constitution as a formula for independence if Smith could prove that the majority of the inhabitants of Rhodesia were in favour [sic] of it. Smith's response was to hold a referendum on the issue and to convene an indaba of tribal chiefs and headmen, arguing that, as eight of ten Africans lived in the tribal areas and as the membership of the African nationalist parties had been concentrated in the towns, the chiefs reflected tribal opinion. Both [Vol. 13:2 RHODESIAN ANTHRAX to power was followed by the detention of Nkomo, which led to riots in the African townships. 49 On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith went on the radio and unilaterally declared independence (UDI).° "Britain recoiled in angers at this first rebellion by a British territory since the American Revolution .... Wilson applied sanctions and backed them by deploying two carrier task forces to cut off Rhodesia's supply of oil."'" Later, to secure international co-operation, Wilson engineered mandatory sanctions from the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter.
5 2 Selective sanctions were imposed against the regime in 1966 and these were made total in 1968. Sanctions busting became a national priority and was refined to an art. 53 lessons learned by their SAS in Malaysia, from the British in Kenya against the Mau Mau, and the United States experience in Vietnam and adopted it to their war. Although they mastered the art of counter insurgency operationsusing the SAS-and the mobile use of helicopter borne troops, the Rhodesians -because of their racist policies-were never able to win the campaign for the 'hearts and minds' of black Africans, a prerequisite in any guerilla campaign. 83 In the early 1970s, the Rhodesians turned to a concept called 'pseudo operations' 84 (pseudo ops), creating the Selous Scouts in 1973 and placing the unit under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Organization's (hereinafter "CIO") Special Branch, rather than the Army." Security personnel would dress as insurgents and infiltrate rural communities seeking out real insurgents.6 When they found the real insurgents, they could opt for an engagement or call ifi their position and allow other army units, notably the RLI, to come in. At first, highly trained white officers of the SAS were used for the operations. But language barriers and the distinct physical facial features of the whites necessitated the use of black Zimbabweans. To do so, injured or captured insurgents were "turned" and made to serve the Selous Scouts.
7 Thus compromised, they could never return to their villages and were beholden to the regime for the remainder of their lives. 8 The new recruits were able to provide intelligence and the latest call signs used by the real insurgents. The British had used a similar pseudo ops concept in Malaya and Kenya. 89 The Selous Scouts were housed in a secret facility near Mount Darwin within the Hurricane Theatre of the war. "The Selous Scouts proved extremely effective in providing the security forces with useful and timely intelligence . . . [and] were responsible for a staggering 68 percent of all insurgent kills and captures in their areas of operation. ' The CIO consisted of two branches, Special Branch responsible for internal security-thus the placement of the Scouts under its wings-and Branch II, which was responsible for external operations, propaganda, disinformation, covert ops, and psychological operations." The Selous Scouts' unrivalled tracking abilities, survival and counter insurgency skills made them one of the most feared and hated of the army units. 9 "murder, rape, smuggling, and poaching," 93 and its members were "psychopathic killers" 94 and "vainglorious extroverts." 95 "To avoid confusion and prevent other government forces from mistaking the Scouts for actual insurgents, any area they were operating in was 'frozen'-that is no other security forces were allowed in its vicinity."" In 1976, Operations "Thrasher" and "Repulse" started in order to contain the ever-increasing influx of guerrillas. 97 At the same time, rivalry between the two main guerrilla factions increased and resulted in open fighting in the training camps in Tanzania, with over 600 deaths. 9 The Soviets increased their influence and began to take a more active role in the training and control of the ZIPRA guerrillas. 99 New tactics were developed on both sides. The Rhodesians decided to take the war to the enemy.
Cross-border operations-which had started in 1976 with a raid on a major base in Mozambique in which the Rhodesians had killed over 1,200 guerrillas and captured huge amounts of weapons-were stepped up by the SAS and later the Selous Scouts."° Attacks on large guerrilla camps such as Chimoio and Tembue resulted in thousands of guerrilla deaths and the capture of supplies sorely needed by the Rhodesians. 1 1 The concept of "Fireforce"' ' 2 was also introduced at this time. The Fireforce concept involved helicopters inserting a "stick" of men from the RLI into an area identified by Selous Scouts as containing insurgents.1 3 The war externally and internally was "heating-up" for the Rhodesians. By 1976, "no one would say so in public--except for the very public act of emigrating-but in private many were prepared to admit that even if defeat was unlikely, victory was impossible."' ' 4 From 1976-78 the war was at its most intense---during this period it is alleged that biological and chemical weapons were used. 
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B. The End of the War
By March 1978, Smith-ready to end the war-hammered out an internal settlement."o' A black Prime Minister was elected through universal suffrage, but the military and intelligence apparatus remained in firm white control.' 6 The international community refused to recognize ZimbabweRhodesia as it was known.' 0 7 In June 1978, the war spiraled out of control, as insurgents shot a civilian airliner out of the sky." 8 Some passengers managed to survive, only to be butchered on the ground by the insurgents. In retaliation, in October 1978 Rhodesian forces invaded Zambia and Mozambique, killing thousands of guerillas in training camps. 0 9 Britain and the United States condemned the raids, saying they could lead to a superpower confrontation in Southern Africa. Towards the end of 1979, talks had begun at Lancaster House in England, with both sides seriously interested in stopping the war, but Rhodesian cross-border raids continued; hitting supply-lines, strategic bridges, and railways in an effort to convince Zambia and Mozambique to put pressure on the guerrilla leaders to end the war"' Rhodesian losses in men and aircraft were increasing, whereas the supply of equipment and recruits to the guerrillas seemed endless. By the end of 1979, therefore, it was becoming.obvious that the Rhodesians would be unable to end the war, despite that their troops were winning every battle and skirmish they engaged in. Early in 1976, the security forces, farmers, and officials urged the government to impose firmer and swifter methods of justice on the "terrorist." From 1976 onward, the "gloves were off' against the insurgents."' The Army's Psychological Operations Unit (PSYOPS) presented a plan to eliminate terrorists. The aim of PSYOPS was: "to kill and capture terrorists and to win over the local population."' 5 The RLI began to kill prisoners it captured in the field." 6 Government assassination of opposition members was authorized and ZANU' s national chairman was assassinated in Zambia by CIO operatives."' Zambian officials sympathetic to ZANU rounded up other leaders because of disinformation implicating them in the assassination. The loss of the leadership set ZANU back politically at least two years, according to the CIO."'
The effectiveness of the assassination and the desperation of the war effort, lead to the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons as "dirty tricks." In the late 1970s, under siege, the orders were given to use chemical and biological agents against the enemy." 9 The techniques used were: a) poisoning wells; b) spreading cholera; c) infecting clothing used by "terrorists;" and d) using anthrax to kill cattle, thus denying food supplies to the guerillas. 
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three toxins: a) Ricin,' 24 an extremely potent toxin that "comes from the castor bean and enters the body intravenously"' 25 ; b) Thallium, a lethal heavy metal similar to rat poison; and c) Parathion. 126 By 1975, clinical trials were performed on humans-a clear and recognized crime against humanity-provided by the CIO from the Selous Scouts' secret detention center in Mount Darwin. 7 The doctors would administer various agents to the prisoners, experimenting with agents and dosages. 2 ' The CIO then disposed of the bodies of the victims down mine shafts. 1 29 By 1976, deployments of the agents were ready and carried out by the CIO, Selous Scouts, and South Africans.
3 ' The chemical and biological agents used by the CIO in the field included: thallium, organophosphates poisons, warfarin, "anthrax bacterium," and other as yet unidentified bacteriological agents. ' The CIO and the Scouts used thallium at first. Thallium was injected into canned meat and through the use of pseudo ops techniques, the poisoned meat was given to insurgents who believed they were being re-supplied by other friendly insurgents.' In one instance, because of a shortage of food in the Tribal Trust Lands-another deliberate tactic of the CIO and PSYOPS-the guerillas gave their thallium-laced food to innocent villagers, thus killing them."' Unfortunately for the CIO, the use of thallium became known. Neither the manufacturer of the canned meat, nor the Ministry of Health knew of this program.' 34 They began an investigation that ultimately led to the uncovering of the facts in the case. 35 [Vol. 13:2
were responsible-used an unknown poison to contaminate a well near heavy guerilla activity close to the Mozambique border.' 37 At least 200 civilians died because the well was the sole source of drinking water for the area. 3 Selous Scouts were instructed to poison watering holes, stagnant water, slow moving streams, and other bodies of water' near guerilla camps inside the Mozambiquean border, as such sources were essential for supply lines.' 40 Cholera was also alleged to have been used by the CIO."' Selous Scouts were told to spread the disease near the border. SAS operativesresponsible for external raids-probably spread cholera inside Mozambique. Nevertheless, the CIO was worried that the use of cholera could backfire and spread into Zimbabwe uncontrolled and affect the Selous Scouts who operated in the field.' 4 2 Selous Scouts were also told to dump cholera in water supplies, most notably the Ruya River. This incident corresponds to a cholera epidemic along the Mozambican side of the river in which an unknown number of fatalities occurred.
4 3 This practice was discontinued because the agent was thought to dissipate too quickly to provide any lasting tactical advantage.
The Rhodesians, with possible assistance from the South Africans launched a program of contaminating clothing. In a mea culpa account, Ken Flower, the Chief of the CIO stated:
For more years than I would like to tell, young men were recruited for the guerilla cause under the aegis of CIO and with the willing co-operation of Kanodareka and his helpers who supplied them with poisoned uniforms. The men would be sent on their way to the guerilla training camps, but before reaching, their destination would die a slow death in the African bush. Many hundreds of recruits became victims of this operation. It became so diabolically successful that exposure seemed inevitable and so the principal perpetrators had to be eliminated The South Africans had two dedicated biological weapons facilities, the Institute of Virology in Johannesburg and the other in a South African Defense Force, (hereinafter, "SADF') veterinary facility near Pretoria.' 45 Under an umbrella project named "Alcora," ' the South Africans and Rhodesians used poisoning agents.' 47 According to a former CIO Officer, they:
[W]ould give us briefings about certain places and we would be warned that the drinking water or, you know, the wells might have been poisoned -but our soldiers didn't do it. There were places where we were categorically told that the waters had been salted [sic] with cholera and we would have to be careful. Truth is, Rhodesia was being used as a laboratory. There were civilian operators, strange types from South Africa .... To be more precise it was South African military intelligence. 1 48
Sweatshirts, uniforms, and other apparel were soaked in chemicals 49 and through the Selous Scouts, these were distributed to insurgent groups near the border with Mozambique. The Rhodesians used organophosphates to poison the clothing of guerillas. 50
A. Anthrax in Rhodesia
For centuries, bacillus anthracis, anthrax, has caused disease in animals and uncommonly, serious illness in humans throughout the world. 5 [Vol. 13:2 RHODESIAN ANTHRAX byproducts.' 53 Herbivores are the most common carrier, they usually ingest anthrax spoors residing in the soil. 54 Animal vaccination programs have reduced the rate of infection among animals.' In humans, the disease is not contagious, thus it cannot be spread readily from one human to another. Three types of human anthrax infection can occur: 1) inhalational, where spores enter the lungs and within a month or some times less, release two types of toxins which result in blood poisoning; 2) cutaneous or subcutaneous, in which the bacteria penetrates the skin; and 3) gastrointestinal, in which the spores are ingested. 6 Cutaneous Anthrax is the most common natural form of the disease with an estimated 2000 cases reported annually.
1 57 The human disease typically follows exposure to a diseased animal.' 58 Research into the use of anthrax as a weapon began more than eighty years ago, and it remains a popular choice as a weapon of terror, particularly in it its most deadly inhalation form.' 59 In Rhodesia before 1978, there was an average of thirteen cases of anthrax a year. 6 By 1979, the Department of Veterinary Services announced that a cattle-bome illness of anthrax had broken out in three Tribal Trust Lands. 6 The disease claimed twenty-one people. 
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because of disease introduced into Zimbabwe from Mozambique by the infiltrating guerillas.' 65 According to another report, a former member of the Rhodesian forces, anthrax was used to kill the cattle of the Zimbabweans.' 6 6 The operation was to reinforce the notion that foreign guerillas were bringing back diseases that would kill cattle. This was another variation of PSYOPS, in its ongoing campaign to alienate the local population from the insurgents.' 67 In contrast to the devastation in the black Tribal Trust Lands, only eleven cases of human infections were reported-with no deaths-in the European farming areas. 6 ' The use of anthrax as a weapon of last resort is not far fetched. The area of northeastern Zimbabwe has ideal conditions, with the right mixture of alkaline pH, nitrogen, calcium, and organic matter. 69 In attempting to crush their opponents and maintain their white minority regime, the Rhodesians, according to Cilliers, often used food as a weapon. 7° On January 28, 1977, the Rhodesian government introduced an amendment to the Emergency Powers whereby control of food supplies was instituted in various areas of Rhodesia.' 7 ' PSYOPS pushed for food control to keep ZANLA insurgents from obtaining food from friendly rural blacks that worked on the white farms.' 72 PSYOPS instituted Operation Turkey in 1977.1 73 The aim of Operation Turkey was twofold: a) cut the food supply to ZANLA; and b) increase animosity between the insurgents and the local population by controlling the supply of food. 174 The Operation was relatively successfulguerillas, believing that they were poisoned by villagers sought out and destroyed villages and killed villagers who had prepared food for them. Further restrictions were put upon the blacks by PSYOPS, such as introducing ration cards, placing limits on the amount of food available in stores, and limits on bulk purchases.' 75 Viewed from this perspective, anthrax may have been a strong part of a plan to reduce food stocks to the native population and not-like the chemical and cholera incidents-an effort at direct genocide. 165 . MANGOLD 
B. The Nass Report
The first non-Zimbabwean to suspect the deliberate use of anthrax was an American doctor, Meryl Nass, a biological warfare epidemiologist. ' 76 From 1989-92, she researched the events of 1978-80.'7 She became interested in how anthrax spores spread so quickly-even in the absence of bovine cases-and engulfed six of the eight Rhodesian provinces.' 78 Even more remarkable was that the white farmers lost only four heads of cattle, with eleven cases of human exposure and no deaths. 179 Nonetheless, why does Nass believe that it was a deliberate spread? First, the large amounts of those infected. Rhodesia had had only 334 cases from 1950-1978.I"' Doctors in Zimbabwe in 1977 had rarely seen an anthrax case. Yet, during the war, anthrax became one of the country's major causes of hospital admissions. 8 ' Next, the large-scale infestation is additional proof of a deliberate spread. Most anthrax outbreaks have a high degree of focality. 82 In Zimbabwe most of the Tribal Trust Lands stretching across six of the eight Provinces were infected.' 83 Many of the cases occurred in areas where there had not been a previous case. The outbreak was centered only in Zimbabwe.'
84 None of its neighbors, according to Nass, had higher than normal reporting of infections.18 Finally, Nass points out that the outbreak occurred when the war intensified to its greatest levels. 86 Nass, however ends her investigation into the use of anthrax, by concluding that "[t]here exists no generally accepted methodology to serve as a guide for the design of an investigation into the possible use of biological weapons."' 8 7
C. Analysis of Anthrax and Other Bacteriological Agents
Drawing inferences from the circumstantial evidence particularly when coupled with the personal accounts-of which Flower's and Ellert' s personal mea culpas are the most convincing-leads one to the conclusion that biological weapons were used in Rhodesia by the security forces. 
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over the alleged use of these weapons was, "first time I've ever heard about it."' 88 While there is one explanation for a possible natural occurrence it is not convincing under the circumstances: by mid-1978 veterinary services outside the white farming area had collapsed and the services were no longer provided." 9 Because of the level of violence in the countryside, inoculation of cattle against diseases had become sporadic since at least 1974 and even then, vets were sent in with armed soldiers.' 9 0 Malaria, bilharzias, and other endemic diseases soared during the period of the anthrax spread. 9' Yet, the collapse of the veterinary and medical system alone does not provide a satisfactory explanation of a naturally occurring outbreak of anthrax. The reason is that anthrax vaccination was not practiced in Zimbabwe even before the outbreak because of the low prevalence of the disease. 92 As a consequence, the collapse of veterinary services would not have had a major impact on cattle in the Tribal Trust Lands.
9 3 The collapse did affect other diseases, such as preventable tick-borne diseases. 94 Between 1975-79 an estimated 250,000 head of cattle died because "dipping" services in the rural areas had been shut down. 9 Sleeping sickness also rose dramatically during this period.1
96
Additional inferences of a deliberate spread can be gleaned from other practices of the Rhodesian CIO along with PSYOPS. CIO's and PSYOPS' use of anthrax would have been consistent with three other practices: 1) it would continue the PSYOPS operation of continuing psychological warfare on rural blacks by highlighting the fact that foreign diseases were the result of the guerillas; 2) CIO was already seeking to deny food supplies to the guerillas in line with "Operation Turkey,"' 97 and finally; 3) CIO would have been attracted to a weapon of last resort to break the morale of the rural blacks. To understand CIO's thinking, one must look at Zimbabwe at the time. As in other parts of Southern Africa, wealth is primarily measured by the number of cattle one has.
98 Therefore, without cattle to measure their wealth, rural blacks' morale would sink and support for the uprising would end. The use of the Selous Scouts furthered this goal. By imitating the guerillas, former officers have retold how massacres were perpetrated. Thus, the rural population would feel threatened by the guerillas. The land allocated to the Zimbabweans was mostly arid, whereas the white areas were relatively fertile. The alkalinity in the soil and the arid conditions would be ideal for the spread of anthrax.
2°° Nass suggests that aerial spraying is one possibility. 20 '
As in other third world insurgencies, the Rhodesians built special protected villages into which the native population was concentrated, mostly involuntarily. 2 2 Congregation of the rural population into one area could have contributed to the ease of intentional infestation by the Security Forces. This goal would meet the first prong of their desired use.
The second reason CIO and PSYOPS would use anthrax was that by destroying food stocks in rural areas, the original goals of "Operation Turkey" would be enhanced. Food was used as a weapon in Rhodesia."
4 Therefore, it is conceivable that the anthrax program was meant to destroy Shona wealth and food processing. By denying the guerillas food, their morale would sink as their supply lines would be unable to support them. This was especially true as the SAS was simultaneously hitting targets outside Rhodesia. The CIO hoped the guerillas would merely starve in the field.
Finally, the CIO and PSYOPS knew that by 1978 the war was unwinnable. The Security Forces could not be beat, as they had won each battle, but neither could they win the war. In addition, the constant call-up of the male population was increasing emigration. 20 5 Most knew that concentrated efforts to end the war had failed. 2 " The enemy was seen to be the villager as well. As shown earlier, post-1975, the CIO and Selous Scouts used untraditional means of warfare. Their operations were always along the line of reducing rural support for black nationalists and lowering morale. To that end, cholera was spread, thallium was used to poison people, and water supplies were poisoned. 27 An interesting analysis is that of the main operational area during the war-the Hurricane Theatre. Here, there were numerous "no go" or frozen areas because of Selous Scout activity in the border area at the time. 2 0 8 It is plausible, that together with legitimate military operations, the Scouts were engaged in spreading anthrax. For example, as noted previously, the Selous Scouts were instructed to pour cholera agents in the Ruya River.
2 " 9 Starting in August of 1973 "Exercise Long Walk" was begun along the Ruya River near Mozambique.
21° Selous Scouts were active in the area and other Security Forces were told to pull out when the Scouts neared their positions.
2 ' Henceforth, Security Forces were instructed not to approach the frozen zone and to stay at least 4000 meters from the Ruya River.
"
2 In 1978, in Mozambique large numbers of ZANLA soldiers arrived from training bases near the border with a bleeding disorder.
21
" At first, a hemorrhagic fever was suspected, but lab results showed warfarin poisoning. The first case of anthrax in humans was reported in November 1978, according to Nass.
215 This is one month after the Rhodesian invasions and bombings of Mozambique and Zambia-the height of the war. Therefore, the outbreak would have coincided directly with a peak in hostilities. The use of anthrax could have strengthened the hand of the whites in the negotiating table illustrating that the black population was enduring the worst consequences of the war, and thus had the most to gain through a negotiated settlement. It was classic bargaining from strength of position.
The evidence shows that Rhodesia had a small indigenous bacteriological and chemical program by 1975 led by Dr. Symington under the supervision of the CIO. 21 6 Anthrax is obtained by lab specimens or through collection of spores in the soil.
2 17 As noted, the Rhodesians became experts at sanctions busting, with false end certificates, dummy companies, and fake airlines.
21 s The RhAF set up dummy corporations such as Air Gabon in Gabon, CargOman in Oman, and Air Trans Africa." 9 Therefore, it is not to hard to imagine that Rhodesians could have obtained a batch of British anthrax spores from sympathetic admirers in Britain or through American labs. Britain experimented with anthrax during the Second World War. 22 ' Anthrax does occur naturally in Zimbabwe, but not in sufficient quantities to justify the expense of field cultivation of spores.
22
Discounting the evidence and dismissing the ingenuity of the Rhodesians for sanctions busting, the main culprit in the proliferation of bacteriological weapons to Rhodesia was most likely South Africa.
223

D. The South African Connection
The main culprit for the Rhodesians obtaining biological weapons has been South Africa. 224 South Africa was an original signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, ratifying it November 5, 1975.25 South Africa has always maintained that its biological weapons program was solely for defensive use. 226 South Africa produced chemical weapons during World War II in Gauteng-responsible for mustard gas production-for the Allies. 227 South Africa claimed that undelivered stocks were destroyed after the war. 22 However, former Allied production sites continued to be used by the South Africans for military purposes. 229 To manufacture anthrax under 'ideal' conditions, high-containment suites are used.
23° However, such facilities were not available to the Allies during World War Two, according to Nass.
23
In 1968, South Africa provided Rhodesia with military support by sending a small contingent to Rhodesia to help with the insurgency. 232 Nonetheless, to see both as an inseparable alliance of white supremacists is somewhat misleading. In 1975, South Africa pulled out most of its military assistance to Rhodesia.
233 If South Africa assisted in the use of bacteriological weapons in Rhodesia, it was most likely for its own personal gain in research, rather than benevolent love. South Africa and Rhodesia were quite dissimilar with their one unifying aspect being continuation of white minority rule. South Africa was willing to sell out Rhodesia in order to appease the international community and buy time for their own Apartheid state. 
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African Project Coast. 235 
2 36 What is known, is that by 1981 the head of 'Project Coast,' Dr. Basson-also known as Dr. Death-visited the U.S., meeting with CBW scientists. 2 37 Project Coast experimented with cholera, botulism, anthrax, chemical poisoning, and lethal microorganisms. 238 The military is alleged to have used cholera-as in Rhodesia-to poison wells, placed anthrax in cigarettes, and placed paraoxon in whiskey and then distributed it. 239 However, there is no mention of South African and Rhodesian collusion. Yet, former CIO members have indicated that the South Africans bank rolled the Selous Scouts and had unfettered access to their Mount Darwin base. 240 Nonetheless, the methods and choice of weapons used would lead to an inference that at least there was communication on shared technology and application at the operational level. 24 engage in formal relations with other states. 244 Meeting those requirements, an entity is a state whether or not it has been recognized by other states. 245 However, there is a crucial distinction between state and government. A government, no matter how violent or wrongful in its origin, is a de facto government if it was in the "actual exercise of sovereignty over a territory and peoples large enough to be a nation." 2 4 De facto can be compared to de jure recognition, where the government is lawfully in power even though it exercises little actual power, for example an exiled government. 2 47 Rhodesia at UDI had all the requirements of a state and its government was therefore, the defacto ruler of the country.
If Rhodesia was a state and de facto government, then are the various treaties outlawing the use of bacteriological/chemical weapons applicable to it? For humanitarian international law to apply there must be an internal or external armed conflict. 2 4 " Armed conflict exists when states resort to force, protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized groups, or between such groups within a state. 249 Rhodesia was in a period of armed conflict from 1965 to 1980, therefore, international humanitarian law applies.
The 
as used in the 1907 Hague and 1925 Geneva Convention. 254 The 1949 Geneva Convention was built upon the prior treaties which have been universally applied. 255 Under Article I of the Geneva Conventions, which makes itself applicable to internal conflicts and civil wars, Rhodesia committed several "grave breaches." By killing cattle, the Rhodesian Security Forces targeted the wealth of the rural population, a violation of Article I(l). Furthermore, the Selous Scouts killed, captured insurgents, or used them for biological experimentation if they did not "turn." ' 56 These practices are a violation of Article Hm(l)(a) 57 Great Britain was a signatory to the Geneva Convention, however Rhodesia was not. Nonetheless, international law and recent cases have elevated Article III of the Geneva Convention to customary law. 25 A violation of the Article is a violation of customary law.
In addition to these two treaties, there is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which renounces the use of biological weapons against human beings.
25 9 The BWC reflects the post-World War H renunciation of biological weapons by the defeated Axis powers and the unilateral renunciation of the use of such weapons by the U.S. in 19 6 9 .2 0 By enlarging the scope of the 1949 Geneva Convention, through Article III, the use of chemical weapons in internal armed conflicts is outlawed. 261 With its declaration of UDI, it is arguable whether the use of these weapons would have been 'illegal' under the Geneva Protocol since Rhodesia was never a party to the Convention, which bans the use and possession of biological weapons. Furthermore, Rhodesia's independence was illegal and not recognized by the international community. 2 62 Nevertheless, the use of such weapons has risen to a violation of customary international law. For a practice to become customary international law there must emerge a general consensus in the international community that furthering the practice violates international customary law. 
now turns to what forum: a Nuremberg-style court, a domestic court, or a foreign court that may have jurisdiction. Under international law, the Rhodesian Security Forces committed two major international crimes: 1) war crimes, and 2) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions."' War crimes-violations of the customs of war, i.e. Hague 1907-include: murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war, wanton destruction, use of biological agents, and devastation not justified by military necessity."' The grave breaches include: willful killing, biological experiments, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in forces of a hostile power, making the civilian population targets of attack, racial discrimination, deportation of population of occupied territory, and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health. 272 If a Nuremberg style court is established, which is doubtful because of the time lapse in the events, criminal prosecution can take place against those members of the Security Forces who perpetuated the crimes and their leaders who authorized the use of these tactics. 273 The principles of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal provides for individual criminal responsibility for war crimes. 274 Leaders and organizers participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan for war crimes and grave breaches are vicariously responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. nation states may be hesitant to occupy themselves with matters that occurred nearly twenty years ago. The international community is too preoccupied with other African conflicts, namely Sierra Leone-the crisis de jure-to contemplate setting up another African tribunal. Nation states might also be sympathetic to the 'losers,' many of whom did lose their livelihoods and property. Secondly, members of the Rhodesian security services are unlikely to testify against each other because many received amnesty for their acts under the Lancaster agreement. In addition, as in all armed services, a code of silence develops in the fogs of war. Finally, that leaves either domestic remedies for the victims or foreign courts.
C. Forum Choices
Perhaps the first outside confirmation came in 1990 from a Defense Intelligence Agency Cable from Harare to Washington, "[aiccording to [source deleted], a member of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts admitted in 1978 that 'they' had tried both chemical and biological warfare techniques to kill terrorists. ' 279 The report went on to say that Rhodesian forces used cholera to poison the water supply. 280 It appears that Washington was, and still is, oblivious to the use of bacteriological weapons in Zimbabwe."' Nonetheless, officials of the U.S. Embassy in Harare seem aware of the situation, but dubious as to its credibility.
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In 1997, the Minister of Health Tim Stamps-a white Zimbabweanpersonally ordered an official investigation into the use of bacteriological agents in the Liberation War. 2 3 Stamps is convinced that through forged documents, the U.S. or U.K., shipped anthrax for legitimate research in a third country, but it eventually wound up in Rhodesia. 2 ' Stamps is convinced that the spread of the disease was deliberate. 28 He points out that the Africans were severely restricted in their movements, the focus of the outbreak being so widespread and the targeting of cattle in particular. 28 6 In 1999, a call was made by university professors to the government of Zimbabwe to investigate the 1975-80 incidents of bacteriological war, in part because of Stamps' insistence. 287 
2003]
undertaken by the government of Zimbabwe. The reasons for not acting against the report are twofold. One, the white population in Zimbabwe fell from around 190,000 in 1980, to 90,000 in 2000. 288 They were the economic backbone of the country. 89 To his credit, Mugabe tried to build a multi-racial country. 9 0 Reconciliation was the tone. The whites were allowed to stay as long as they knew their place in the new country.
During the 1990s, Mugabe faced several problems to his rule. In 1990 there were fewer jobs for blacks than there were in 1975 and real incomes were down from what they were in 1975.29' In an attempt to escape domestic problems, Mugabe turned to the legacy of land distribution in Zimbabwe. In 2000, farm invasions began as the government attempted to illegally seize white farms.
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White emigration began again and in 2001, the white population was less than 50,000 consisting mostly of retired persons. Mugabe-through his ministers-keeps the specter of whites being allpowerful and treacherous. Nonetheless, he cannot institute an inquiry because it just might show that anthrax was not used in the conflict or worse yet, that Mugabe and his side might have done their own dirty tricks. Mugabe and his ministers recently insinuated that the remaining whites may use anthrax again against the black government.1 94 On October 25, 2001, the Deputy Health Minister said that exiled Rhodesians and white Zimbabweans were preparing an anthrax attack. 295 The state controlled media the same week interviewed rural farmers in a recent anthrax outbreak. The rural farmers claim that the remaining white commercial farmers have activated the anthrax used in the liberation war. 296 In January 2002, the government orchestrated an 'anthrax scare' and blamed it on the opposition political party and white farmers-one of their supporters. 297 However, these inquiries were quickly suppressed:
ZANLA and/or ZIPRA may also have had complicity in spreading the biotoxins around. The war between ZANLA and ZIPRA, was by far the deadliest and most destructive aspect of the liberation struggle. ZANLA was fighting ZIPRA as much as it was the Rhodesian Army. ZANLA may have become aware of the Rhodesians' bio 'dirty tricks' and used them, such as the poisoned food tins, against villages sympathetic to ZIPRA, possibly even with the Rhodesians' help. Or, ZIPRA may have done the same to ZANLA, but I think the former is more likely. I think this is a more logical explanation for why a more comprehensive investigation has never been undertaken. In the current environment, this is the perfect story to vilify the remaining whites in Zimbabwe and justify seizing their property. The GOZ [government of Zimbabwe] would only have to go after a handful to make the case that its campaign against the whites was part of the war on terrorism, and this, in turn, could give the West pause in vilifying the GOZ (I don't think it would lead to a mass white exodus, however). Instead, the 'story' that the whites were planning an anthrax attack, and the 'story' about anthrax-like substances turning up at the central post office disappeared quickly. I suspect someone on high squashed any further investigations because of where it might lead.
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In conclusion, domestic remedies against those remaining Security Forces personnel would be highly unlikely under the Mugabe regime and his co-opted justice system. If the trials were to show that there was no use of chemical/biological weapons, Mugabe would be unable to continue to use whites as scapegoats. If whites are found to be guilty of the use of these weapons, the stigma attached could well produce the final exodus of whites in the country, plunging it into complete economic chaos.
Therefore, the last and the most feasible option for those affected during the liberation war is to use the forum of a third country whose laws would allow an alien to seek compensation for damages, like the United States or Belgium. In the United States, Zimbabweans may use the Alien Tort Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), enacted in 1789 which creates federal court jurisdiction for suits alleging torts committed anywhere in the world against aliens in violation of the law of nations. 2 In addition, federal common law has incorporated international customary law. 3 " Therefore, an alien within the U.S. can pursue a claim against the former Rhodesian Security Forces. In fact, on September 9, 2000, Zimbabweans living in the U.S. filed suit against 
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